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CASE COMMENTS
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND ACT OF STATE ---

A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN

INSTITUTING SUIT IN A UNITED STATES COURT WAIVES IMMUNITY
TO A SET-OFF ARISING FROM AN ACT OF THAT SOVEREIGN.

First National City Bank of New York loaned a Cuban
governmental corporation fifteen million dollars secured by
United States government bonds and other obligations. After
the ascension of the Castro government in 1959, the bank's
Cuban branches were expropriated without compensation. Subsequently the bank sold the collateral, realizing 1.8 million
dollars in excess of the amount of the loan. In a suit by
the Cuban government corporation's successor for the excess,
the bank counterclaimed for the value of its seized branches.
Plaintiff contended that the counterclaim was barred by the
principle of sovereign immunity or, alternatively, by the act
of state doctrine. Held, plaintiff's motion for summary
judgement denied. By instituting suit in a United States court,
a foreign sovereign waives immunity to set-offs, and although
the set-off is based on the public acts of the sovereign, the
Hickenlooper Amendment1 directs that the act of state doctrine
will not preclude a determination of the merits. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 270
F. Supp. 1004 (SoD.N.Y. 1967).
The court's sovereign immunity holding is consistent with
2
established law since the executive branch had not suggested
immunity and the resulting presumption against immunity governed.
But by allowing defendant more than set-off relief the court could
have served better the "ultimate policy of fairness" on which its
decision was partially based. Only a lower New York court has
allowed an unlimited counterclaim against a sovereign plaintiff.3
While, in that case, the counterclaim was compulsory, there seems
to be no valid reason for maintaining the compulsory-permissive
dichotomy in this situation.
The instant case was the first'in which the Hickenlooper
Amendment was asserted affirmatively; previously it had been used
only defensively to persuade the court to determine the illegality
of public acts upon which a sovereign plaintiff based its claim
in a United States court.4 In addition to directing courts to
determine the merits of such cases, the Amendment states that, for
expropriations to be internationally legal, they must be compensated.
Thus the amendment effectively vitiates the act of state doctrine's
exception to the conflict of laws principle that, unless contrary to
an important forum policy, the lex locus delicti provides the model
for the law to be applied. Affirmative assertion of the Hickenlooper
Amendment dramatizes its effect: the application of United States law
to a foreign sovereign acting within its own territory. This result
-39-

may be justified in light of the Amendment's underlying policy
of encouraging and protecting American investment in underdeveloped countries; but the result creates jurisprudential
problems and does not seem justified in light of the search
for an international legal order based on traditional concepts
of territoriality.

FOOTNOTES

1. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 §301 (d) (4),
§ 2370 (e) (2) (1964).

as amended 22 U.S.C.

2. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955);
See Maier, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State: Correlative or
Conflicting Policies?, 35 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 556 (1966).
3. Et re Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., 25 Misc.
2d 299, 204 NYoSo 2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd 17 App. div. 2d
927, 233 NoYoS. 2d 1013 (1962).
4. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.NY.
1965), Final order entered 272 F. Supp. 836, aff'd 383 F. 2d 845
(1967).
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INTERNATIONAL LAW - NUREMBURG DOCTRINE INVOKED IN
DOMESTIC COURT-MARTIAL

In 1967, United States Army Captain Howard Levy was

court-martialed for willful disobedience of a lawful order.
Levy had refused to teach methods of treating skin diseases
to Vietnam-bound medical aides. At the court-martial, Levy
contended that since the medical aides in Vietnam were guilty
of calculated atrocities and crimes against humanity, his
disobedience was exculpated under the doctrine of the Nuremburg trials. Although the presiding officer ruled that the
doctrine of the Nuremburg trials could be raised as a defense
for refusing to obey an order, the Nuremburg defense did not
prevail and Levy was convicted because he was unable to establish that the medical aides were guilty of war crimes or
1
crimes against humanity.
In 1946, the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal
found the leaders of Nazi Germany guilty of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and crimes against peace. 2 The Tribunal
rejected the accuseds' contention that persons who carry out
orders for the state are not personally liable for them. The
Tribunal said that individuals have international duties
which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed
by the individual state and that persons who violate the laws
of war cannot obtain immunity while acting pursuant to the
authority of the state if the state in authorizing action
3
moves outside its competence under international law.
By allowing the Nuremburg doctrine as a defense, the
presiding officer in the Levy case implicitly recognized the
existence of an international standard of conduct which may
supersede national law in certain instances, as where
obedience to military orders would facilitate the commission
of war crimes or crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, the
Nuremburg definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity
show that the international standard of conduct (at least as
reflected by the Nuremburg trials) proscribed only the grossest
violations of human rights and dignities. At Nuremburg, war
crimes were defined as violations of the laws or customs of
war such as the killing of hostages, deportation to slave
labor of the civilian population in occupied territory, plunder
of public or private property, and wanton destruction of cities,
towns or villages. Crimes against humanity were such acts as
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, or persecutions
on political, racial, or religious grounds. 4 Clearly the
Nuremburg doctrine is only a recognition of the minimum require-
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ments of human rights and the presiding officer in the Levy
case was correct in holding that these minimum requirements
5
had not been violated by the medical aides.
Although the recognition of an international standard
of conduct in the Levy case is merely a restatement of the
Nuremburg doctrine, the recognition is important because it
comes from a domestic court. A declaration by the Nuremburg
Tribunal (which was itself of limited jurisdiction and was
largely the product of politics and emotion) 6 that the
sovereignty of nations is limited by superseding international
laws may have less effect upon the domestic use of international law than a declaration by the court-martial tribunal
to the same effect. International law is given effect in
international tribunals, regardless of national law. International law is also recognized in domestic courts. 7 But, in
domestic courts when international law conflicts with national
law, the national law has precedence. 8 Consequently, in
giving precedence to international law, the Levy case is contrary to the preponderance of authority. Nevertheless, the
Levy case is not really significant for its value as legal
precedent. The real significance of the Levy case is that it
may be the initial step in recognizing the relevance of international law in domestic affairs, and as such it may signal a
change in attitude toward the domestic use of international
law.

FOOTNOTES

1. For the facts in the Levy case, see New York Times, May 19
through June 4, 1967. Levy's attempt to prove that the medical
aides were guilty of war crimes or crimes against humanity
failed to establish any substantial violations of human rights.
Indeed, some of the witnesses who testified for Levy did not
feel that the medical aides were guilty of any violations of
human rights.
2. At the Nuremburg trials crimes against peace constituted
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of war against
agression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances. Probably because the criteria for
these crimes had no relation to the specific offenses alleged
by Levy, there was no mention of these crimes at the courtmartial.
3.

22 Proceedings in the Trial of Major War Criminals 466 (1946).
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4. 39 Am. J. Int. Law Supp. 257, 260 (1945). The particular
acts constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity were
not condemned at Nuremburg unless they were committed in
execution of a common plan and conspiracy.
5. Traditionally the doctrine and practice of international
law has been that only states have rights and duties. But
in recent years there has been increasing recognition of the
individual as an international personality possessing rights
and duties. W. Bishop, International Law 265 (2d ed. 1962).
The Nuremburg trials and the Levy court-martial are specific
instances in which the courts have held that individuals
have international duties. The Genocide Convention, U.N.
Doc. No. A/1517 (1950) (reprinted in 45 Am. . Int. L. Supp.
13 (1951), the International Declaration of Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. No. A/810 (1948) (reprinted in W. Bishop, International Law at 270-73 (2d ed. 1962), the Human Rights
Commission of the United Nations, and the Geneva conventions
are evidence of the continuing interest in international
human rights. Possibly if the Levy defense had looked to
some of the resolutions and conventions since Nuremburg it
would have found good arguments that the international standard
now included more individual rights and duties than reflected
by the Nuremburg doctrine.
6. Finch, The Nuremburg Trial and International Law, 41 Am. J.
Int. Law 20 (1947).
7. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). See also Sprout,
Theories as to the Applicability of International Law in the
Federal Courts of the United States, 26 Am. J. Int. Law 280
(1932).

8.

See W. Bishop, International Law 69
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(2d ed. 1962).

